At the beginning of President George W. Bush’s first term, many Chinese wanted to know: Why does Bush dislike us? Is China losing the United States?

Now, as Bush’s second term begins to wind down, the current issue of Foreign Affairs provocatively asks: “Is China Winning Asia?”

I explained to students and faculty at Beijing University who asked the first two questions in 2001 that they ought to exercise patience, that the rhetoric of the previous year’s U.S. presidential campaign would soon confront the practicality of running the country and effectively interacting with the world – including China.

Sure enough, although I hardly anticipated the timing and specifics of 9-11, an urgent, collective priority did intrude and a multitude of tensions surrounding U.S.-China relations quickly receded.

Actually, there was never a serious chance that China would lose the United States or vice versa; the two need one another too much in today’s increasingly shrinking, interdependent world.

Similarly, the practicality of running China and effectively interacting with the world – including the United States – should trump speculation about whether one or the other is winning Asia.

Washington, after all, is not going to shed its superpower status anytime soon – no matter how much influence Beijing amasses – and it certainly will not give up its alliances and interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Nor should it.

Victor Cha, the author of the Foreign Affairs piece, goes even further, arguing that conventional wisdom is wrong, that the U.S. position in Asia is stronger than ever. He goes on to say that the Bush administration has achieved “a pragmatic, results-oriented, cooperative relationship with China, and it has expanded and strengthened its alliance with Japan just as Tokyo and Beijing are improving their bilateral relations.” Cha also notes that the United States has improved its defense ties with South Korea and is working through the six-party talks to shut down North Korea’s capacity to make nuclear weapons. Lastly, he underscores Washington’s enhanced presence in Southeast Asia, primarily as a result of U.S. leadership and assistance after the 2004 tsunami.

Be that as it may, China is grappling with more than enough issues to compel its focus; it should not waste time thinking about surpassing the United States in Asia.

Amy Chua, in her new book Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and Why They Fall, provides this summary: “China faces a daunting list of internal challenges, including staggering pollution, corruption, regional wealth disparities and soulless mass consumerism.”

Indeed, the single biggest task for Beijing, in terms of leadership and legitimacy at home, is to continue shifting millions of Chinese from the ranks of the “have-nots” to the “haves” at its impressive rate of recent years. Should that economic miracle stumble, China’s problems would escalate.

Moreover, China has far to go in its relations with the Asia-Pacific region. The military power that Beijing wields with increasing assurance and visibility understandably causes worry and uncertainty. So does China’s economic growth. Although the country provides a huge market to the region, it also competes for resources. Further, there’s the matter of the overseas Chinese, who are still regarded with suspicion in many Asian countries. Also, in certain places where the Chinese have come to dominate local economies, outright hostility is not unusual.

In addition, as Cha states, China has yet to distinguish itself as a provider of public goods. He called its response to the 2004 tsunami “slow, feeble and parochial.”

Finally, another question begs for an answer: Does China aim to win Asia or the world?

Chua concludes that China will not become a hyperpower; indeed, it may not desire the burdens or the resentment that would accompany global dominance.

For the foreseeable future, I have to agree; the practicality of running China and effectively interacting with the world deserves more attention than musings about winning or losing.