Minxin Pei, the author of China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy, is the Tom and Margot Pritzker Professor of Government and Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies at Claremont McKenna College. He discussed China’s high-profile fury over a $6.4 billion U.S. arms sale to Taiwan with McClatchy-Tribune foreign-affairs columnist John C. Bersia.

Q: Were you surprised by the intensity of the Chinese response?  

A: No, it was predictable. At the same time, their response was not out of line. Rhetorically, they are tough, but the only substantive retaliation is the suspension of military exchanges with the United States, which is viewed as being of dubious value by both sides anyway. The only thing that China can do that would hurt the United States is to block sanctions against Iran at the United Nations. But China would pay a heavy price, as well, and I doubt that it would go that far.

Q: What are your own thoughts about the arms deal — good idea or bad?

A: It is not bad or good. It is a political reality. It is not going to change the military balance; in fact, it may actually make the balance better. This package was part of a larger package approved by the Bush administration in 2001. So it does not signify a new approach by the Obama administration. Politically, it is necessary for Taiwan’s moderate Kuomintang government to show that it is tough on defense even as it engages the mainland politically.

Q: How does this situation compare with Beijing’s reaction to past arms sales from Washington to Taipei?

A: It is about the same as Beijing’s reaction to the Bush administration’s sale of arms to Taiwan last time. It is a calibrated response.

Q: Might the rift threaten overall U.S.-China cooperation during the long term?

A: No way. China has wide-ranging interests in a cooperative relationship with the United States. So it will not allow arms sales to derail the bilateral ties. The political context is extremely important. Today, the United States is selling arms to a government in Taipei that is no longer pushing for independence. So this time it is indeed different.

Q: What kind of impact might this have in relation to global trouble spots where Washington needs or seeks Beijing’s assistance?

A: As I mentioned above, it could have some impact on Iran, where China’s unhappiness has certainly clouded an already murky situation. Not so in the case of North Korea, because China has its own interest in keeping Pyongyang in a box.

Q: Could China’s anger produce lasting damage to the carefully nurtured, improving relationship between Beijing and Taipei?

A: Not likely. Taiwan and China are moving in the right direction. This package will not send the wrong signal to the Taiwanese government (in the sense that it should slow down its reconciliation with Beijing). On the other hand, a return to power of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party would derail Taipei-Beijing ties.  

Minxin Pei can be reached at mpei@cmc.edu.