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Jack Mendelsohn, a former senior Foreign Service officer, a member of the SALT II and START I delegations and a former deputy director of the Arms Control Association, discussed the new START treaty with foreign-affairs columnist John C. Bersia.

Q: What are the key details that everyone needs to understand?

A: The agreement limits strategic (i.e., long-range) nuclear warheads on missiles and heavy bombers for both the Russians and the Americans to an aggregate total of 1,550 on no more than 700 deployed systems (i.e., individual missiles and bombers), plus another 100 non-deployed (trainers, displays, spares, etc.). There is a bit of wiggle room in that a heavy bomber counts as one warhead even though it may carry many more weapons (eight to 20). It has been customary –- at U.S. insistence –- to “discount” bombers in these agreements because they are not a first-strike system, are recallable, must face defenses, etc. The treaty also re-establishes an elaborate and comprehensive inspection/verification system so the two sides can have some confidence in the activities and compliance of each other.

Q: Relative to previous arms-control agreements, how significant is this one?

A: It has the usual significance in that it establishes a predictable, verifiable arsenal on both sides. It has unusual significance in that it marks a continued effort to shrink the size of the nuclear universe, and reverses some of the egregious damage done by the last administration’s policies (the Moscow Treaty is explicitly null and void when this one takes effect). In addition, it is part of an Obama administration trifecta: the Nuclear Posture Review, which revised declaratory policy, and foreswore new weapons and new missions; the new START agreement; and the nuclear security summit. Also, it fits into in the larger framework of the president’s commitment to a nuclear-free world (not in his lifetime, though), which includes a future effort to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conclude a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).

Q: Is it as helpful as supporters say?

A: It’s helpful in that it establishes a valid framework of weapons constraint (the old START agreement had run out in December 2009, and the Moscow Treaty was a joke), continues the downward trend in the size of arsenals, and re-establishes contact with the Russians on a vital security issue. For the hard-core arms-control community, it doesn’t cut deeply enough, reaches the reduction goals by down-loading warheads(and leaving empty spaces on missiles that could be up-loaded in a crisis), and doesn’t deal with non-deployed warheads (off-loaded warheads do not have be destroyed).

Q: Or as bad as critics maintain?

A: There’s nothing really new in the design of the treaty, so the critics are essentially those who don’t believe the United States should be making deals with a potential adversary about its own national security. As the levels get lower, the critics become more agitated, arguing that either we are exposing ourselves to dangerous challenges, giving others an incentive to develop their own nuclear forces (either to compensate for a “furling” of the nuclear umbrella or because we don’t seem so formidable an adversary), or unilaterally disarming in a dangerous world.

Q: Is this one of those rare moments that begs for bipartisanship?

A: Well, we’ve had it in the past on votes for these treaties. Ratification requires 67 votes, so the Democrats have to find at least eight Republicans. I have no idea what will happen, but I suspect Senator Richard Lugar will not oppose it and some other Republicans will come along. It is not a social or economic issue. Thus, I suspect it will be ratified.

Q: Could this treaty smooth the way to other arms-control agreements?

A: The arms-control community would certainly like to see something on tactical nuclear weapons, as would the hard-liners because the Russians have a big advantage there. For the very same reason, the Russians can’t be too excited about giving up the weapons they think might actually be useful. The arms-control community would also like to deal with the question of non-deployed (stored, reserve) warheads and residual arsenal size. Further, it would like to see additional cuts in the warhead/delivery system levels. I frankly don’t see much happening soon. As for the administration, it wants to try to get the CTBT ratified and work in the United Nations disarmament committee on an FMCT. Hardliners wouldn’t mind picking up the tactical nuclear weapons issue (because of its impact on the Russians), dislike the CTBT, don’t care much for the FMCT and don’t think lower numbers are in our interest. Finally, the Russians are still concerned about missile defenses and keep saying they can’t go much lower (1,500 has been their number for some time now). It’s the same old problem: Missile defenses and low warhead levels are antagonistic, not complementary, goals.

Q: What other arms-control problem-areas need attention?

A: My own view is that the best move would be to increase transparency (around the world) of nuclear infrastructures and activities. That will be an essential if we are really headed down to low levels and, someday, zero nuclear weapons. But I don’t necessarily believe that’s what will happen.

Jack Mendelsohn can be reached at acajack@aol.com